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Data on contestants’ choices in Italian Game Show Affari Tuoi are analysed in a way that sepa-
rates the effect of risk attitude (preferences) from that of beliefs concerning the amount of 
money that will be offered to contestants in future rounds.  The most important issue addressed 
in the paper is what belief function is actually being used by contestants.  The parameters of this 
function are estimated freely along with the parameters of a choice model.  Separate identifica-
tion of the belief function and preferences is possible by virtue of the fact that at a certain stage 
of the game, beliefs are not relevant, and risk attitude is the sole determinant of choice.  The ra-
tional expectations hypothesis is tested by comparing the estimated belief function with the 
“true” offer function which is estimated using data on offers actually made to contestants.  We 
find that there is a significant difference between these two functions, and hence we reject the 
rational expectations hypothesis.  However, when a simpler “rule-of-thumb” structure is as-
sumed for the belief function, we find a correspondence to the function obtained from data on 
actual offers.  Our overall conclusion is that contestants are rational to the extent that they make 
use of all available relevant information, but are not fully rational because they are not process-
ing the information in an optimal way.  The importance of belief-formation is confirmed by the 
estimation of a mixture model which establishes that the vast majority of contestants are for-
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A Test of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis using data from a Natural Experiment 
 
1.  Introduction 
When an individual is faced with a choice problem under risk, that individual’s risk attitude is 
the principal determinant of their choice.  However, this assumes that the payoff from the choice 
is instantaneous.  If the payoff is made at some future date, and the eventual payoff is dependent 
on the state of the world at that future date, or on some intervention by others, then the individ-
ual’s beliefs of what will pertain at that future date must enter the decision making process.  
Obvious examples are found in economics: schooling decisions depend on individuals’ beliefs 
about the structure of the labour market that will pertain several years in the future; firms base 
their investment and production plans on beliefs about the future evolution of consumer prefer-
ences. 
Researchers analysing such decisions clearly cannot rely solely on choice data, because 
any observed choice is usually compatible with many different combinations of risk attitudes 
and beliefs.  This is a problem that is frequently encountered in experimental economics, al-
though not all researchers appear to recognise it or to pay due attention to it. 
One notable exception is Manski (2002), who analyses the problem in the context of an 
ultimatum game.  He emphasises that the proposer’s decision depends on her subjective prob-
ability distribution of the respondent’s possible reactions, and that knowledge of the observed 
decision alone is insufficient to identify the proposer’s decision-making process.  In contexts 
such as this, researchers have tended to appeal to rational expectations theory, and to assume 
that agents form the same beliefs as would a researcher with access to econometric estimation 
facilities.  This, of course, places structure on agent’s beliefs, allowing the researcher to isolate 
risk attitudes (henceforth “preferences”).  However, although many tests of the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis appear in the macroeconomics literature (see Attfield et al., 1991), there is little 
evidence of whether agents behave according to the rational expectations hypothesis in micro-
economic contexts. 
An alternative approach, reviewed by Manski (2004), is to ask individuals directly about 
their beliefs.  Bellemare et al. (2005) follow this approach, again in the context of an ultimatum 
game.  They find that a model estimated with this information on beliefs incorporated, has 
higher predictive power than a model based on the assumption of rational expectations.  How-
ever, belief elicitation can itself cause problems: Rutström and Wilcox (2006), in an experiment 
on the repeated matching pennies game, find that agents tend to alter their strategies when asked 
to state their beliefs about opponents’ behaviour. 
In recent years, the analysis of data from television game shows has become a popular 
means of analysing individuals’ behaviour under risk.  It is obvious why researchers favour this 
sort of data.  Game shows provide a good natural context in which contestants face well-defined 
decision problems in a ceteris paribus environment.  Furthermore, it cannot be denied that con-
testants have salient incentives, allowing studies using such data to overcome both the Harrison 
and List (2004) and the Rabin (2000) critiques.
1  One game show that scores particularly highly 
on these criteria is the Italian show Affari Tuoi, data from which is analysed in this paper.  This 
game is played in many different countries under different names and with slightly different 
rules.  Researchers seem to be in agreement on the usefulness of the resulting data: Bombardini 
and Trebbi (2007) assert that Affari Tuoi “presents several features that we would have chosen, 
were we to design such an experiment”; Post et al (2008) describe the Dutch version of the same 
game as having “such desirable features that it almost appears to be designed to be an econom-
ics experiment rather than a TV show”. 
    The rules of Affari Tuoi will be explained in detail in Section 2.  For the time being, let 
us simply recognise that the contestant faces a sequence of choice problems, in which the choice 
is between an uncertain lottery, and a certain amount offered by the “Banker”, and that if the 
                                                 
1 See, among the others, Friend and Blume (1975), Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995), Beetma and Shotman (2001) and 
Hartley et al. (2005) for an analysis of individual risk attitude through TV games. 
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Banker’s offer is accepted, the game ends.  Many researchers have now realised that, at each 
stage of the game, a typical contestant is not treating the choice problem as a single isolated 
task, but is instead forming beliefs of what will happen in future rounds, and using these beliefs 
in making their decision in the current round.  In particular, they are forming an expectation of 
what the Banker’s offer will be in future rounds, should they stay in the game.  It is clear that 
such beliefs have the potential to influence the current decision.  It is also clear that this setting 
bears similar features to that of the ultimatum game considered earlier, with the attendant diffi-
culties in separately identifying preferences and beliefs. 
There has been a large volume of recent research analysing data from the various differ-
ent versions of this game show (see the survey of Andersen at al., 2007).  Much of this research 
has focused on the search for the best characterisation of behaviour under risk (e.g., Botti et al., 
2008).  Typically, the assumption of rational expectations is implicitly adopted, whereby the in-
ferential problem of predicting the Banker’s offer is solved outside the choice model.  This is 
done in a variety of ways, usually based on parametric characterisations (e.g., de Roos and 
Sarafidis (2006), Deck et al. (2008) and Mulino et al. (2006)). 
In this paper, we treat the formation of beliefs about the Banker’s offer as the central fo-
cus.  In particular, by incorporating a predicted Banker’s offer equation into the choice model, 
we are able to estimate the equation that contestants actually use to form beliefs.  We are then 
able to compare this true belief equation with the equation that would be used under the as-
sumption of rational expectations, hence enabling a formal test of the rational expectations hy-
pothesis. 
With these objectives in mind, we note that the game show has a peculiar structure: in 
the final round of the game, contestants’ choices unequivocally reveal information on their risk 
aversion (since there is no contamination from beliefs about future rounds).  The information on 
risk attitude extracted from the choice made in the final round is combined with information on 
choices from earlier rounds in order to identify the parameters of the belief function that is used 
by contestants in these earlier rounds. 
In addition to testing for rational expectations, we provide an assessment of the validity 
of another assumption that has been made in previous work: that all contestants are forward-
looking.  While it may seem natural for contestants to base their decisions on their beliefs of 
what will unfold in future rounds, it is doubtful that every contestant behaves in this way.  We 
would therefore like to allow for a proportion of the population to be forward-looking, and for 
the remainder to be “myopic”, that is, to base their choice solely on the possible outcomes from 
the current round.  This leads us to a “mixture model”, of the type estimated in very similar con-
texts by Conte et al. (2008) and Harrison and Rutström (2008).  One of the parameters in the 
mixture model is the “mixing proportion” which represents the proportion of the population 
who are forward-looking.  This parameter is estimated along with the preference estimates for 
both models and the belief estimates for the forward-looking model. 
In Section 2, the rules of Affari Tuoi are explained in detail.  Section 3 provides a theo-
retical analysis of the choice problem perceived by contestants, and a discussion of the identifi-
cation problem.  In Section 4, we construct the log-likelihood function for the choice model, and 
describe our chosen method for maximising it.  Section 5 presents the results from the choice 
model, and also reports the result of a test of the rational expectations hypothesis.  Section 6 re-
ports on the estimation of the choice model with an alternative belief function, to which we refer 
as the “rule-of-thumb” belief function, and which appears to fit the choice data better than the 
function assumed in Section 5.  Section 7 estimates a model that assumes that the belief function 
for future offers includes a stochastic component.  Section 8 reports on the results of a mixture 
model which allows the co-existence of myopic and forward-looking contestants.  Section 9 
concludes.  Appendix 1 contains the results of a Monte Carlo study whose purpose is to verify 
the identification of the choice model.  Appendix 2 reports on our analysis of the data on 
Banker’s offers, and obtains the functional forms and fitted equations that are used in the test of 
the rational expectations hypothesis in Section 5. 
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2.  The game 
Affari Tuoi is a 5-round stop-and-go game between a contestant and a Banker.  The game starts 
with 20 contestants, one from each of the 20 Italian regions.  They are each randomly assigned a 
sealed box, containing one of the 20 prizes displayed in Table 1.  The show begins by contest-
ants answering a general knowledge question.  The first contestant to answer correctly is se-
lected to play the game. 
 
€  0.01  €  5,000 
€  0.20  €  10,000 
€  0.50  €  15,000 
€  1  €  20,000 
€  5  €  25,000 
€  10  €  50,000 
€  50  €  75,000 
€  100  €  100,000 
€  250  €  250,000 
€  500  €  500,000 
Table 1: List of prizes as displayed to contestants. 
 
In each of the 5 rounds, the selected contestant opens a fixed number of boxes (6 in the 
first round, then groups of 3 boxes); on each occasion that a box is opened, the cash value of 
that box is revealed, indicating a sum of money which is no longer available to the contestant. 
At the end of each round, the Banker makes a proposal: he either offers “the swap”, that 
is, the opportunity to change her box with one of the remaining boxes of her own choosing; or, 
he offers a definite amount of money to her to quit the game.  Throughout the paper, we refer to 
this definite money amount as the Banker’s offer.  If the contestant accepts the Banker’s offer, 
the game ends; otherwise she proceeds to the next round.  If the contestant reaches the final 
round, and rejects the Banker’s offer in this round, she receives the content of the box in her 
possession at that time. 
Our sample consists of 298 showings, and therefore contains data on 298 contestants’ 
decisions
2.  Figure 1 shows, for each round, the number of contestants receiving a Banker’s of-
fer and the number of contestants accepting that offer.  Figure 2 shows the proportion of con-
testants accepting the Banker’s offer by round.  It is calculated by dividing the number of con-
testant accepting an offer in any round by the number of contestants receiving an offer in that 
round.  This proportion is seen to rise dramatically in the course of the game. 
 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed description of the data set used in this paper, see Botti et al. (2007, 2008). 













Figure 1: The number of contestants receiving a Banker’s offer in each round (column height) and the number of 















Figure 2: The number of contestants accepting an offer in each round as a proportion of the number receiving an of-
fer in that round. 
 
In the analysis that follows, we restrict attention to decisions made in rounds 3, 4 and 5, 
so we lose the four contestants who accept the Banker’s offer in round 2, leaving a sample of 
294.  Our principal reason for restricting attention to the last 3 rounds is that, since offers are 
rarely accepted in rounds 1 and 2, there is insufficient variability in the data to explain the 
choice process.  We also focus attention solely on the instances when the Banker makes a mone-
tary offer; we do not analyse the behaviour of contestants when offered the “swap”, previously 
mentioned.  The reason is that we do not consider the “swap” decision to be informative: a ra-
tional contestant must be indifferent between swapping and not swapping.
3  Of course, this as-
sumes that the contestant has no information whatsoever about the content of their own box.  It 
is a simple matter to test this assumption econometrically.  To such a test we now turn. 
It is often claimed (e.g. de Roos and Sarafidis, 2006; Mulino et al., 2006) that, in the 
Italian game, since the Banker knows the contents of the contestant’s box, he tends to base his 
offer on this information.  This could raise the possibility of strategic behaviour by contestants: 
that they base their decision on information extracted from the Banker’s offer.  Let us briefly 
investigate this claim.  The following table shows the correlation coefficient between the offer 
measured as a proportion of the expected value of the lottery, and the content of the contestant’s 
box.  These correlations are computed separately for the three rounds. 
 
                                                 
3 Blvatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) focus attention on the swap in Affari Tuoi. 
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  correlation  p-value 
Round 3  0.086 0.160 
Round 4  0.092 0.146 
Round 5  -0.045 0.636 
Table 2: Correlation per round between the Banker’s 
offer measured as a proportion of the expected value 
of the lottery, and the content of the contestant’s box. 
 
We see that these correlations are small in magnitude, and none of them is significantly 
different from zero.  Hence we are not able to corroborate the claim that the Banker’s offer con-
tains information about the content of the contestant’s box. 
Regardless of this finding, let us investigate whether the contestant is able to extract in-
formation, from any source, about the contents of their box.  To this end, we simply investigate 
the determinants of the contestant’s decision to accept the “deal”.  We estimate a random effects 
probit model of “deal” acceptance, with, as explanatory variables, the expected value of the lot-
tery (EV), the offer as a proportion of EV, the standard deviation of the lottery, and the content 
of the contestant’s box. 
 
Decision to accept  the Banker’s offer (“deal”) 
EV  -0.00090 
(0.00223) 
Banker’s offer ÷ EV  2.90676 
(0.30181) 
Std. Dev. lottery  0.00777 
(0.00201) 
Content of  contestant’s box  -0.00045 
(0.00065) 
intercept  -2.66549  
(0.22340) 
Number of contestants(n)  631 
Average number of 
choices per contestant 2.1 
Log-likelihood -278.26633 
Table 3: Results from a random effect probit regression of 
the contestants’ decision to accept “deal”.  
 
The most important conclusion from the results in Table 3 is that the content of the con-
testant’s box appears to have no effect on the contestant’s decision.  From this we infer that, 
even if it were possible for the contestant to glean information from the Banker’s offer or from 
another source, there is no evidence that such information is being used by contestants in form-
ing their decisions. 
 
3.  Modelling choice rules 
In the final stage of the game, the contestant is offered a one-shot choice between participating 
in a lottery with two equi-probable outcomes (the remaining two prizes), or accepting the final 
offer made by the Banker.  In any given round other than the final round, contestants are not 
evaluating a one-shot lottery, but a sequence of nested lotteries, and the offer in later rounds 
might be higher (or lower) than the one they currently face.  Every possible lottery that might be 
encountered in future rounds needs to be considered.  For each of these possible lotteries, an ex-
pectation must be formed of the Banker’s offer that might be made.  Let  ( ) t off X %  be the random 
variable representing the Banker’s offer in future round t, given the set of remaining prizes X.  
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Let  () () | t Go f f X X %  be its probability distribution function, conditional on the set of prizes X.  
Further, let  ()
e
t off X  be the mean of this distribution, so that we may write 
() ()
e
tt off X off X υ =+ %  where υ is a mean-zero random term. 
Contestant i accepts the Banker’s offer in round t if: 
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% .  (2) 
 
() it it EU X  is the value of continuing with the game beyond round t; 




%% %  is the expected utility of an offer received in a future round 







 possible lotteries deriving from the third-
round lottery  3 i X , that contestant i might face in round 4 by opening 3 of the remaining 8 








ble lotteries in the fifth round:  3 ij k X ,  1, ,10 k = K .  Similarly  4 ij X ,  1, ,10 j = K , represents 







 possible lotteries deriving from the fourth-round lottery  4 i X , that might be 
confronted in round 5 by opening 3 of the remaining 5 boxes.  Finally,  ( ) 55 ii EU X  is simply the 
expected utility of the lottery consisting of the two outcomes remaining in round 5.  Note that, if 
it is assumed that there is no random element in the future offer (i.e. that υ = 0), then 
() ( ) . t EU off%  simply reduces to  () ( ) . t Uo f f % .  This is the case we start with in Section 4.  We then 
introduce the possibility of a positive variance of υ in Section 7. 
The problem of separating beliefs from preferences has been raised in Section 1.  We 
remarked there that, as a way of overcoming this problem, researchers commonly rely on the 
hypothesis of rational expectations.  For example, de Roos and Sarafidis (2006) and Mulino et 
al. (2006) use data on offers made in all showings in order to form predictive equations for the 
Banker’s offer in each round.  Then, they use the prediction thus obtained as the contestant’s be-
lief.  Andersen et al (2006, 2007) and Post et al. (2008) do similar. 
In a departure from this convention, this paper recognises that Affari tuoi provides a 
suitable environment to estimate both preferences and beliefs in the absence of any restrictive 
assumptions about the way that beliefs are formed, and hence to test whether such beliefs are in 
fact formed according to rational expectations theory.  This is possible because, in round 5, con-
testants’ choices do not involve any belief formation.  The contestant’s problem in round 5 is 
just a straightforward choice between two lotteries: one with two equi-probable prizes; the other 
being a certainty of the Banker’s offer.  It is only in rounds 3 and 4 that beliefs are formed.  Un-
der the reasonable assumption of invariance over time of contestants’ preferences, we are there-
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fore able to combine the data from round 5 choices with that from rounds 3 and 4 in order to es-
timate preferences and beliefs jointly.  Of course, in doing this we are making the further identi-
fying assumption that the belief functions are the same for all contestants.  In making such an 
assumption, we are simply following the conventions of those who have assumed rational ex-
pectations (e.g. Post et al., 2008). 
An important point is that the distribution of the risk aversion parameter in round 5 is 
truncated from above, for the obvious reason that the most risk-averse contestants are likely 
leave the game in earlier rounds.  This might raise concerns of attrition or selection bias in esti-
mation.  This would indeed be a problem if we were estimating preferences using data from 
only round 5.  But the simultaneous use of data from all three rounds enables us to estimate the 
complete distribution of preferences over the population.  It is intuitively helpful to imagine the 
following sequence being repeated until convergence: first, the preferences of the contestants 
reaching round 5 are estimated; then these contestants’ choices in earlier rounds are used to de-
duce their beliefs; the beliefs thus estimated are extended to contestants who left the game be-
fore round 5; finally, the preferences of these other contestants are deduced, filling in the trun-
cated upper tail of the risk attitude distribution.   
For readers not satisfied with this explanation, we have also carried out Monte-Carlo 
simulations in order to confirm the validity of our estimation procedure.  For the purpose of the 
simulation, we assume that the game consists of only two rounds, corresponding to the “fourth” 
and “fifth” rounds of the real game, and that there are 300 contestants.  We have used actual lot-
teries and offers from the fourth and fifth rounds of the real game to generate the situations as-
sumed in the simulated game.  All that is simulated is the contestants’ decisions.  For each of 
1000 replications, two models are estimated using the method of maximum simulated likelihood 
(see Section 4).  The first model is one that is applicable to a “selection” sample similar to the 
real data.  That is, individuals who accept the deal in the “fourth” round are not observed in the 
“fifth” round.  The second model is one that uses information on both decisions by every con-
testant, whether or not they accept the deal in the “fourth” round.  Note that this second model is 
indisputably free of any selection problems.  Both models are estimated using the same simu-
lated data. 
Further details of the simulation are presented in Appendix 1.  The important conclusion 
from the simulation is that both beliefs and preferences appear to be consistently estimated in 
both models.  Hence it is established that consistency is achieved even with the most risk-averse 
contestants being selected out in early rounds. 
 
 
4.  The econometric choice model 
In this section we introduce the econometric model that simultaneously estimates preferences 
and beliefs.  We assume throughout that contestants are expected utility maximisers.  We further 

















,  (3) 
 
where x is the outcome
4, xmax is the highest possible outcome (500 thousand euros).  Note that 
the functional form of (3) results from a normalisation that ensures that U(0)=0 and U(xmax)=1.  
ri is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for contestant i.  We assume, in the spirit of Holt 
and Laury (2002), that this coefficient is distributed across the population according to: 
 
                                                 
4 Here, and throughout the paper, we measure money amounts in units of €1,000. 
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( )
2 ~, ir r rN μ σ .  (4) 
 
Let us first assume that the future offer function has a degenerate distribution, so that 
the error term υ introduced in Section 3 is identically zero, and contestants place a probability of 
1 on the event that the future offer equals the expected value of the offer, 
e
tt off off = % .
5  It follows 
that the expected utility of the future offer in (3) collapses simply to the utility of the expected 
offer: 
 
() () () ( ) ..
e
tt EU off U off = % .  (5) 
 
Given this assumption, the latent variable underlying a contestant’s choice is: 
 
() ( ) it i t it it it yU o f f E U X ε
∗ =− + .  (6) 
 
Here  it ε  is a Fechner-type error term (Hey and Orme, 1994), with  ()
2 ~0 , it N ε ε σ .  It 
has the interpretation of a computational error in the calculation of utilities and expected utili-
ties.  This error is assumed to be homoscedastic and uncorrelated with all other variables in the 
model.  Let us define the binary variable yit to take the value 1 if contestant i accepts the 
Banker’s offer in round t, and the value -1 otherwise.  The relationship between the observable 
variable yit and the latent variable 
∗
it y  is then given by: 
 
1 it y =        if        0
∗ > it y  
1 it y =−        if        0
∗ ≤ it y . 
(7) 
 
It is clear that for each contestant, we observe either a sequence of minus-ones (if the 
contestant never accepts the money offer) or a sequence of minus-ones followed by a plus-one 
(if the contestant accepts an offer).  Let  ( ) | it fyθ  be the probability of the choice observed for 
contestant i in round t, conditional on the values of the model’s parameters which are assembled 
in the vector  θ.  From (14) and (15), this probability is given by: 
 
() ( ) ( )
|
i t it it
it it




=Φ × ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
θ .  (8) 
 
Contestant i’s likelihood contribution is the joint probability of observing the sequence 
of outcomes () 3,,
i ii T yy L , where Ti is the round in which the game ends for contestant i.  Given 










=∏ θθ .  (9) 
 
We also allow for the possibility of sub-optimal behaviour, by introducing a tremble pa-
rameter, ω  ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ω ) (Moffatt and Peters, 2001).  This represents the probability that contest-
ants lose concentration and choose completely at random between the two alternatives.  With 
this additional parameter, contestant i’s likelihood contribution becomes: 
                                                 
5  This assumption is relaxed in Section 7 below, where we assume that the stochastic term υ has a positive variance. 
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Lf y θθ   (10) 
 










.  After estimation of ψ, an estimate of ω  is deduced, and a standard error is 
found using the delta method (Oehlert, 1992).  Other parameters that are constrained, such as 
() 0 r σ ≥  and  () 0 ε σ ≥ are estimated using similar techniques. 
The full sample log-likelihood is given by: 
 












LogL f y θθ .  (11) 
 
To understand how the maximum simulated likelihood technique has been applied to 
this problem, we simply note that  i r i r η μ + = , with  ( )
2 ~0 , η σ ir N .  Note also that θ in (11) in-
cludes μr, but not ηi.  We can integrate ηi out to obtain  
 










⎛⎞ ⎧⎫ =− + ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟
⎩⎭ ⎝⎠ ∏ ∫
i T
i
ii t i i
t rr
L fy d θθ .  (12) 
 
Following Lerman and Manski (1981), this integral can be approximated by a sample 
average of the integrand computed drawing R numbers from a standard normal distribution.  
This way we obtain an unbiased estimator of the integral in (12), with a variance that goes to 
zero as R increases. 
Note that (12) is the log-likelihood function for the straightforward random-effects pro-
bit model (Avery et al., 1983) except for the fact that the unobserved heterogeneity term (ηi de-
fined above (12)) enters the model in a highly non-linear way (see (3)). 
 
5.  Estimation of the choice model and a test of rational expectations 
In this Section, we estimate the model constructed in the previous section, using the method of 
maximum simulated likelihood.  Our sample consists of 294 players observed making 2.15 
choices on average.  In each model, integration over ηi is performed by simulation using 100 
draws for each contestant based on Halton sequences (Train, 2003).  We adopt this procedure in 
preference to the more commonly used Gauss-Hermite quadrature, since, given the complexity 
of the model, the computational burden is considerably lower for the former than for the latter. 
Table 4 presents estimates of the model, with a CARA specification.
6  The results are 
presented in two columns.  The first column contains the results of the model estimated with all 
parameters unconstrained.  The second shows the results obtained with the parameters of the be-
lief functions constrained by the assumption of rational expectations.  These constrained pa-
rameters, derived in detail in Appendix 2, are as follows.  The rational expectation of the fourth-
round offer, given information on fourth-round offers made in all showings, depends on the Ex-
pected Value of the lottery (EV) in the following way: 
                                                 
6 We have also used a CRRA and an Expo-power specification, assuming non-zero lifetime wealth as a parameter to 
be estimated, along similar lines to Andersen et al. (2006).  We find that the estimate of the lifetime wealth parameter 
is not significantly different from zero.  However, the use of these specifications never significantly improves the fit 
over the CARA specification (cf Andersen et al, 2006; de Roos and Sarafidis, 2006; Post et al, 2008).  The various 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
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( ) 4 exp 0.460 0.857log =⎡ − + ⎤ ⎣⎦
% RE off EV .  (13) 
 
The rational expectation of the fifth-round offer is: 
 
( ) ( ) 5 min ,exp 0.665 1.305log ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦
% RE off EV EV .  (14) 
 
Note that (14) incorporates the fact, clearly evident in the data, that fifth-round offers 
are “upper-censored” at EV.  That is, in round 5, the Banker’s offer is frequently exactly equal 
to EV, but very rarely above EV (see Figure A2.4 in the Appendix). 
The unconstrained model is estimated assuming the same functional forms as (13) and 
















.  (15) 
 
The difference is that in (15) the four parameters are treated as unknowns, and estimated 
freely within the choice model. 
Constraining the parameters of the belief function, as done in the second column of Ta-
ble 4, is in line with the approach of other researchers cited in Sections 1 and 3.  Here, we note 
that on the evidence of a likelihood ratio test comparing the two columns (χ
2(4) = 14.24; p = 
0.008), there is a significant difference between the parameters actually used by contestants to 
form beliefs (column 1) and those estimated using all the available information (column 2).  
This test result amounts to a strong rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis.  In particu-
lar, the negative estimate of γ5 in the first column indicates that contestants do not recognise the 
fact that fifth-round offers are upper-censored.   
Given this rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis, it is important to consider 
what the consequences are of incorrectly assuming it.  Firstly, we note that the estimate of the 
risk-attitude parameter ( r μ ) is noticeably larger when rational expectations is assumed, than 
when estimation is free.  This implies that the assumption of rational expectations is causing a 
bias in the estimation of risk attitude, such that contestants appear to be more risk averse than 
they truly are.  
The significantly positive estimates of  r σ  vindicate the assumption of varying risk atti-
tude over the population
7.  The Fechner error parameter, ε σ , is significantly different from zero 
in the constrained model, but not the unconstrained model.  This suggests that, after allowing 
for heterogeneity in the risk aversion parameter, very little measurement error remains to be ex-
plained.  Finally, the tremble parameter is statistically significant.  Its magnitude (in the uncon-
strained model) indicates that contestants lose concentration on around 4% of occasions.  This is 
in line with estimates obtained elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Loomes et al., 
2002). 
 
                                                 
7   Parameters representing standard deviations of error terms, and tremble probabilities, are clearly con-
strained to be non-negative, and the hypothesis under test is one for which the parameter of interest is on 
the boundary of the parameter space.  Many authors have acknowledged the problems that arise in this 
situation (see, for example, Hey and Orme, 1994, footnote 17, Moffatt and Peters, 2001).  There is usually 
a simple remedy: for a test with size 0.05, the 0.10 column from tables should be consulted to obtain the 
appropriate critical value.  This remedy has been prescribed in a more general context by Godfrey (1988, 
p.94).  
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  Estimation with be-
liefs unconstrained  
Beliefs formed under 
rational expectations  

















th round beliefs equation:  () () ( ) 44 4 .e x p l n . off EV γβ =+ %  
4 γ
  0.52476 
(0.14716)  -0.46000 
4 β
  0.64452 
(0.03881)
  0.85700 
5
th round beliefs equation:  () () () ( ) 55 5 .m i n . , e x p l n . off EV EV γβ ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦
%  
5 γ
  -1.11559 
(0.80626)
  0.44800 
5 β
  1.12931 
(0.21191)
  1.30479 
Number of contestants (n)  294  294 
Average number of choices per 
contestant  2.15 2.15 
Log-likelihood -232.54020  -239.65688 
Table 4: The table contains estimates from the model defined in (6) and (7).  Be-
lief functions are defined in the table.  The assumed utility functional is CARA.  
The estimation technique used is maximum simulated likelihood.  Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses.  Some of the standard errors have been obtained using 
the delta method.  The results are divided into two columns: the first is uncon-
strained; in the second, the parameters  4 γ ,β4 , 5 γ and β5 are constrained to satisfy 
the rational expectations hypothesis, according to (13) and (14). 
 
This result has important implications, namely, that it is invalid to assume that beliefs 
are formed as if all available information is being efficiently processed, and any model that does 
so is likely to suffer from bias in the estimation of the risk attitude parameter. 
In unreported estimation, we also take into account the possibility that contestants be-
lieve they will get a swap (instead of a Banker’s offer) in round 4 and/or 5.  The results so ob-
tained do not differ significantly from those in Table 3, for the reason that the estimated prob-
ability that contestants assign to a swap is not significantly greater than zero. 
 
6.  A “rule of thumb” belief function 
In Section 5, we presented the offer functions that best explain the data on all offers.  It was 
with these offer functions in mind that we approached the estimation of our choice model: we 
assumed that contestants formed beliefs using a function with the same structure as the esti-
mated offer function.  However, the belief function that best explains the choices of contestants 
is not necessarily the same as the belief function that best explains actual offers.  In this Section, 
we address the question of what belief function is actually used by contestants in making their 
choices. 
Our approach to addressing this question consists of trying out different belief functions 
within the choice model, and using nested and non-nested tests to determine which is best able 
to explain the choice data.  To this end, many different specifications of the belief function have 
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been investigated.  We do not report the results from all of these, but we focus on the one that 
appears to represent actual beliefs most closely.  For reasons that will become clear, we refer to 
this specification as the “rule of thumb” belief function. 
Under the “rule of thumb” belief function, contestants use the following very simple 
















.  (16) 
 
That is, they predict the offer in round 4 to be some fixed multiple β4 of the expected 
value of the prizes remaining in that round; and they similarly predict the offer in round 5 to be 
a multiple β5 of the expected value of prizes remaining in that round. 
Table 5 contains results from a model based on this assumption.  As in Table 4, the re-
sults are divided into two columns: unconstrained estimates; and estimates constrained accord-
ing to the rational expectations hypothesis.  In the first column, we see that β4 and β5 are both 
estimated with high precision, and the estimate of β5 is significantly larger in magnitude than 
that of β4.  This simply confirms that contestants correctly expect the Banker to become more 
generous as the game progresses. 
The Vuong test-statistic (Vuong, 1989) for the null hypothesis that the models in the 
first columns of Tables 4 and 5, are equally close to the true model, against the alternative that 
the first is closer to the true model, is 7.56 (N(0,1), p-value = 0.00000).
8  Hence we have over-
whelming evidence that contestants are forming beliefs using the “rule-of-thumb” belief func-
tions, in preference to the “superior” functions given by (13) and (14), that make optimal use of 
the data. 
The second column of the table shows the estimates of the model with the parameters β4 
and β5 constrained to equal the values obtained by performing (external) regressions of actual 
offer on EV, using the entire data set.  We firstly see that the estimates obtained in the uncon-
strained model are not significantly different from those obtained in the external regressions, 
which is loosely consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis.  We further note that a 
likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the parameters exactly equal their external estimates 
gives the  ()
2 2 χ  statistic  () 2 236.53 235.54 1.97 ×−= , which is not significant.  We therefore 
conclude that, under the auxiliary hypothesis of the “rule-of-thumb” belief function, we have no 







                                                 
8 For the Vuong tests performed in this work, we always use a correction for the degrees of freedom that corresponds 
to the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Model with “rule of thumb” beliefs 
 
Estimation with beliefs un-
constrained  
Beliefs formed under “rule-
of-thumb” rational expecta-
tions  

















th round beliefs equation:   ( ) ( ) 44 .. off EV β = %  
4 β   0.38340 
(0.02901)  0.33170 
  5
th round beliefs equation:    ( ) ( ) 55 .. off EV β = %  
5 β   0.54627 
(0.04672)  0.56674 
Number of contest-
ants (n)  294 294 




Log-likelihood -235.54346  -236.52784 
Table 5: Estimates from the model defined in (6), (7) and (16).  The assumed util-
ity functional is CARA. The estimation technique used is maximum simulated like-
lihood.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Some of the standard errors 
have been obtained using the delta method. The first column presents uncon-
strained estimates; in the second, the parameters β4 and β5 are constrained to satisfy 
the (rule-of-thumb) rational expectations hypothesis. 
 
 
Figures 3 and 4 present, for rounds 4 and 5 respectively, graphical comparisons between 
the “rule-of-thumb” belief functions estimated using the model, and those estimated externally 
using actual offers, data on which is also shown in the graphs.  In each case, we see that the es-
timated belief function is impressively close to the external estimate, providing further evidence 
in favour of rational expectations with “rule-of-thumb” beliefs. 
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Figure 3: Banker’s offer against EV in round 4.  The dotted line is a 45
0-line.  The superimposed continuous line 
represents the prediction according to the (unconstrained) estimated belief function in Table 3.  The dashed line 
represents the OLS prediction of the Banker’s offer using the “rule-of-thumb” belief function.    
 
 
Figure 4: Banker’s offer against EV in the round 5.  The dotted line is a 45
0-line.  The superimposed continuous line 
represents the prediction according to the (unconstrained) estimated belief function in Table 3.  The dashed line 
represents the OLS prediction of the Banker’s offer using the “rule-of-thumb” belief function. 
 
7.  Introducing randomness in contestants’ beliefs 
The models estimated in previous Sections are based on the assumption that the future offer 
function has a degenerate distribution, that is, that the contestant assigns a probability of one to 
their prediction of the Banker’s offer in future rounds.  In this Section, we relax this assumption, 
by allowing contestants to form a subjective non-degenerate probability distribution of what the 
offer may be in future rounds.
9  We need to modify the model describing contestants’ forward-
looking behaviour to introduce this component of uncertainty in their expectations. 
Suppose, as at the start of Section 3, that the offer function in round t is 
 
( ) ( ) ..
e
tt off off υ = + % .  (17) 
 
and assume that the error term υ  has a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
2




tt off N off υ σ % . 
                                                 
9 See also Mulino et al. (2006). 
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Given the assumption of normality, we can appeal to a well-known result
10 to deduce 
the expected utility of the offer as: 
 
() ()










υ σ ⎡⎤ − ⎛⎞ ⎣⎦ =− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
% .  (18) 
 
We note that the presence of the stochastic term υ  in the belief function has the effect 
of increasing the expected utility of future offers.  (25) is simply used in place of (13) in Section 
5,
11 and estimation proceeds as normal, with the additional parameter υ. 
 
Model with randomness in contestants’ beliefs 
r μ   0.02382 
(0.00256) 
r σ   0.01945 
(0.00217)
 
ε σ   0.01101 
(0.01063) 
ω   0.05398 
(0.02618) 
υ σ   2.70866 
(14.22065) 
4
th round beliefs equation:   () () υ β + = . .
~
4 4 EV f of  
4 β   0.38833 
(0.03861) 
5
th round beliefs equation:   () () υ β + = . .
~
5 5 EV f of  
5 β   0.55632 
(0.06474) 
Number of contestants (n) 294 
Average number of choices 
per contestant  2.15 
Log-likelihood  -235.49498 
Table 6: Estimates from the choice model defined in (14) and (15), with the 
offer function subject to randomness (24).  Belief functions are reported 
above.  The assumed utility functional is CARA  The estimation technique 
used is maximum simulated likelihood.  Standard errors are shown in paren-
theses.  Some of the standard errors have been obtained using the delta 
method. 
 
The results are presented in Table 6.  These simply show that the introduction of the ad-
ditional element of randomness has a negligible impact on previous results (cf. Table 5, Column 
1).  Moreover, the standard deviation of the error term in the offer function,  υ σ , is not signifi-
cantly different from zero.  This suggests that contestants do indeed assign a probability of one 
to the event that the Banker’s offer will exactly equal their expected offer.  If we were asked to 
make a rough intuitive interpretation of these findings, it would be that there is already enough 
uncertainty in the following rounds due to the fact that contestants do not know which lottery 
they will face, that they are reluctant to introduce another dimension of uncertainty to their own 
decision problem.  This idea is also consistent with the finding, discussed at the end of Section 
6, of contestants neglecting the probability of being offered a swap in later rounds. 
                                                 
10 See Yassour, Zilberman, and Rausser (1981). 
11 The derivation of the formula for the normalized utility function used in previous models is straightforward. 
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8.  A mixture model of myopic and forward-looking behaviour 
Throughout the analysis so far, we have assumed that contestants are forward-looking.  That is, 
they consider the possible outcomes in future rounds when forming a decision during the cur-
rent round.  However, it is not obvious that all contestants are forward-looking.  Some might be 
“myopic”, and treat each round as an isolated risky choice problem.  A model that allows for the 
co-existence of both types is a finite mixture model.  Such a model is estimated in this Section. 
One reason for estimating the mixture model is that it is important to know whether a 
significant proportion of subjects are myopic.  At the end of Section 3, it was explained that 
self-selection is not an issue since, although the most risk-averse tend to leave the game early, 
this does not bias either the risk attitude parameter or the estimates of contestants’ beliefs.  
However, this reasoning only applies if contestants actually have a forward-looking perspective.  
The presence of myopic contestants in the sample can introduce an attrition bias in the estima-
tion of the forward-looking model, since these contestants have a higher probability of leaving 
the game early, since they neglect the prospect of generous offers in later rounds.  Ideally, there-
fore, we hope for the proportion of myopic subjects to be zero. 
We continue to denote as Li contestant i’s likelihood contribution (12) under the as-
sumption of forward-looking behaviour.  We also introduce 
myopic
i L  to be contestant i’s likeli-
hood contribution under the hypothesis that she behaves myopically.  
myopic
i L  is the same as Li 
in (12), except that the expected utility term  ( ) it it EU X  , introduced in (1) and (2) for forward-
looking contestants, no longer takes account of the outcomes of future rounds; for myopic con-
testants,   () it it EU X  is simply the expected utility of the lottery consisting of the prizes remain-
ing in round t. 
Let  () 01 ππ ≤≤ be the mixing proportion, which is the proportion of the population 




ii i L LL π π =− + .  (19) 
 
Table 7 reports the parameter estimates for the mixture model, alongside estimates from 
a pure-myopic model and a pure-forward looking model.  The estimates from the pure-
foreward-looking model are the same as those from the first column of Table 5, and are repro-
duced here in order to facilitate comparison.  Firstly and most importantly, the mixing propor-
tion is estimated, with reasonable precision, to be 0.911 (with 95% confidence interval 
0.856 0.966 π << ).  This implies that around 91% of the population are forward-looking and 
only around 9% are myopic. 
Let us now focus on the estimates of the mixture model (third and fouth columns of Ta-
ble 7).  Comparing the estimates of mean risk attitude ( r μ ) for the two types, we note first that 
myopic types are more risk averse than forward-looking types.  We further note that the esti-
mate of  r μ for myopic contestants (0.068) is almost six times as large as that estimated on the 
assumption that all subjects are myopic (0.01236; first column).  The explanation for this differ-
ence is straightforward: when the myopic model is forced to explain the behaviour of forward-
looking contestants, their tendency to reject Banker’s offers is interpreted as straightforward 
risk-lovingness, and it is inevitable that the estimate of the risk aversion parameter will be very 
low.
12 
The estimated standard deviation of risk attitude,  r σ , for myopic types, is much smaller 
in the mixture model (0.00074), than in the model assuming all individuals are myopic (0.0064).  
This difference simply reflects the fact that the two types differ quite markedly in their risk atti-
tude, so a model that assumes all individuals are of one type will inevitably over-estimate the 
                                                 
12 See de Roos and Sarafidis (2006) and Mulino et al. (2006) for a more detailed explanation. 
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spread of risk attitude.  The estimates obtained in the mixture model of  r μ and  r σ  for forward-
looking types are very close to the estimates obtained in the model that assumes that all indi-
viduals are forward-looking with “rule-of-thumb” beliefs (Table 5, first column).  This is for the 
simple reason that the majority of individuals are forward-looking, as indicated by our high es-
timate of π in the mixture model.  The same reasoning applies to the two parameters  4 β  and 
5 β , whose estimates under the mixture model agree closely with those in the first column of 
Table 5. 
 
  All contestants 
 Myopic 
All contestants  
Forward-looking  Mixture model 
     Myopic type Forward-looking type


























th round beliefs equ.: 
( ) ( ) 44 .. off EV β = %    
4
th round beliefs equ.: 
() () 44 .. off EV β = %  
4 β   -  0.38340 




th round beliefs equ.: 
( ) ( ) 55 .. off EV β = %    
5
th round beliefs equ.: 
() () 55 .. off EV β = %  
5 β   -  0.54627 
(0.04672)  -  0.55738 
(0.04995) 






π   - -  0.91112 
(0.02810) 
Number of con-
testants (n)  294 294  294 
Average number 
of choices per 
contestant 
2.15 2.15  2.15 
Log-likelihood -261.97520  -232.54020  -227.41220 
Table 7: Estimates from the myopic model, the forward looking model, and the mixture model defined in (19).  Be-
lief functions are defined in the Table.  The assumed utility functional is CARA.  Maximum simulated likelihood 
used in estimation.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Some of the standard errors have been obtained using 
the delta method.  The parameter π  represents the proportion of the population who are of the forward-looking type. 
 
The magnitude of the computational error, as represented by  ε σ , is still small in the 
mixture model, but is significantly smaller for myopic types (0.00004), than in the model that 
assumes all individuals are myopic (0.037; Table 2, first column).  The reason for this is similar 
to that advanced above in the context of the parameter  r σ . 
The tremble probability, ω , is assumed to be the same for both types in the mixture 
model
13, and we see that its estimate is small and insignificant.  
                                                 
13 We know of no reason to presume that one type of individual trembles more than the other. 
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The posterior probability of each contestant being of the forward-looking type can be 








Pi f o r w a r dy y
L
π
== L ,  (20) 
 
Its distribution over the 294 contestants is shown in Figure 5.  As expected, the majority 
of contestants have a high posterior probability of being of the forward-looking type. 
In unreported work, we also estimate the choice model under the hypothesis that con-
testants are not fully forward-looking, but look just one-step-ahead.  That is, when in round 3 
they only consider all the possible lotteries and the consequent offers they might get in round 4.  
Unfortunately, Affari Tuoi is such that the sequence of rounds is not sufficiently long to capture 
the difference between the one-step-ahead model and the forward-looking one; these two mod-
els predict different behaviour only in round 3.  A mixture model has been estimated with these 
two forward-looking types, and another model estimated with myopic behaviour as a third type.  
These mixture models fail to converge, and we attribute this to the inability of the data to distin-
guish between the two types of forward-looking behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 5: A histogram of the posterior probabilities of being a forward looking type over the sample of 294 contest-
ants. 
 
This is not to say that this is not an interesting research question.  We have firmly estab-
lished that the vast majority of contestants are forward-looking, but it is not clear how far for-
ward-looking agents are looking ahead.  We therefore encourage researchers with access to data 
from games with more rounds to perform similar analysis to that carried out here, in order to 
address this important question. 
The key conclusion from the analysis in this Section is that it is safe to assume that for-
ward-looking behaviour prevails.  This is a welcome result, since it means that the attrition bias 
resulting from the presence of myopic contestants in the sample is not likely to be severe. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The econometric problem of estimating the belief function has been the principal focus of the 
paper.  The separate identification of beliefs and preferences in this choice model was given an 
intuitive rationalization in Section 3, where we also justify the assumption using a Monte Carlo 
study.  One result (established in Section 7) is that beliefs are deterministic: once a belief has 
been formed about the Banker’s offer in a particular round, the contestant assigns a probability 
of one to this value.  More importantly, we have been interested in whether such beliefs are 
formed in accordance with the rational expectations hypothesis.  In order to test the rational ex-
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pectations hypothesis, we have compared the belief function estimated within the choice model 
to the “true” offer function estimated using the complete data set of Banker’s offers.   
A problem with this approach that was not raised earlier is that, in order to implement 
the assumption of rational expectations, we are implicitly assuming that each contestant has ac-
cess to the complete set of Banker’s offers.  The obvious logical problem with this assumption 
is that contestants cannot possibly know what offers are made in future games; they can only 
know about offers that have been made previously to their own participation.  However, we are 
following other researchers (e.g. Andersen et al., 2006, 2007; Deck et al., 2008; Mulino et al., 
2006; Post et al., 2008) in assuming that all information, including future offers, is available. 
In any case, the principal objective of this paper has not been to estimate the rational 
expectations model, but rather to test the rational expectations hypothesis using a more general 
model.  Our unconstrained model is fully flexible in terms of the parameter values in the belief 
function, which is estimated within the choice model, and therefore should tell us how beliefs 
are actually formed, on the basis of information which is actually available to the contestant at 
the time decisions are made.  One of our principal findings has been that, at least in the context 
of Affari Tuoi, the estimates of the belief function in the unconstrained model do not closely 
match the estimates of the offer function obtained using sophisticated processing of the offer 
data.  Therefore, constraining the choice model to incorporate the estimated offer function re-
sults in biased estimation of the preference parameters. 
However, the situation in which we found the belief function to differ from the true of-
fer function was under the assumption of an optimal structure of the offer function, including all 
of the features, for example upper-censoring, that are apparent in the offer data.  When a less 
elaborate structure is assumed for the belief function, in which it is simply assumed that con-
testants believe that the offer at a given stage of the game will be a fixed multiple of the ex-
pected prize, we find that the belief function estimated within the choice model is not signifi-
cantly different from that estimated from data on actual offers.  We have referred to such beliefs 
as being determined by the “rule-of-thumb” belief function. 
Hence we are led to the conclusion that, again in the context of Affari Tuoi, contestants 
are rational up to a point.  They appear to be using all of the information that is available (i.e. all 
of the offer data), but they do not appear to be using it in an optimal way. 
Of course, a different conclusion may be reached in the analysis of data from other 
game shows.  Our recommendation to other researchers is that it is always desirable to estimate 
the belief function in an unconstrained way as a component of the choice model, rather than to 
rely on prior assumptions about the manner in which such beliefs are formed. 
Another important conclusion of the paper, established forcefully through the mixture 
model estimated in Section 8, is that the vast majority of subjects are forward-looking, meaning 
that they do indeed take into account expectations of the Banker’s offer in future rounds when 
making their choice in the current round.  This finding confirms the importance of the role of 
contestants’ beliefs, and of discovering how these beliefs are formed.  It also confirms the valid-
ity of the forward-looking choice models, estimated in Sections 5 and 6, that are the focal point 
of the paper. 
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Appendix 1:  Monte Carlo Simulation 
As explained at the end of Section 3, the purpose of the simulation is to confirm that the belief 
functions are separately identifiable from the preference parameters, with choice data only.  For 
the purpose of the simulation, we assume that the game consists of only two rounds, corre-
sponding to the “fourth” and “fifth” rounds of the real game, and that there are 300 contestants.  
The experiment uses 1000 replications.  At each replication, two models are estimated (using 
MSL): “selection” and “no-selection”.  The “selection” model assumes (as in the real game) that 
contestants accepting “deal” in the fourth round do not make a decision in the fifth round.  The 
“no-selection” model assumes that decisions are made in both rounds, regardless of the decision 
in the fourth.  The “no-selection” model is clearly not subject to any sort of bias, and so pro-
vides a useful benchmark for evaluating the performance of the “selection” model. 
 
Model with selection; sample size = 300 
  True value  Mean  Std. Err.  p-value of 
t-test 
Mean risk attitude  0.02000 0.02000 0.00006  0.9576 
Log std. dev. risk attitude  -4.42285 -4.46636 0.00623  0.0000 
5 β   0.55000 0.54908 0.00283  0.7447 
Log. Std. Dev. Fechner-error -2.99573 -3.00695 0.00675 0.0969 
Table A1.1: The table reports summary statistics of the Monte Carlo study.  The assumed utility func-
tional is CARA.  The beliefs equation assumed is  ( ) ( ) 55 .. off EV β = % .  Number of replications: 1000 
 
Model with no-selection; sample size = 300 
  True value  Mean  Std. Err.  p-value of 
t-test 
Mean risk attitude  0.02000 0.02003 0.00005  0.5702 
Log std. dev. risk attitude  -4.42285 -4.45692 0.00544  0.0000 
5 β   0.55000 0.55036 0.00263  0.8910 
Log. Std. Dev. Fechner-error  -2.99573 -3.00652 0.00617  0.0806 
Table A1.2: The table reports summary statistics of the Monte Carlo study.  The assumed utility func-
tional is CARA.  The beliefs equation assumed is  ( ) ( ) 55 .. off EV β = % .  Number of replications: 1000 
 
Tables A1.1 and A1.2 contain the results from the “selection” and “no-selection” mod-
els respectively.  Each model has four parameters.  For each parameter, the mean estimate is 
taken over replications, and this mean compared to the true value of the parameter using a t-test.  
The p-values for each t-test are shown in the final column of the tables.  We see that three of the 
four parameters appear to be “correctly” estimated in both models.  Most importantly, the 
(mean) risk attitude parameter and the fifth-round belief parameter (β5), are both correctly esti-
mated, even in the situation in which risk-averse contestants are being “selected out” of round 5.  
The only parameter that is not correctly estimated is the log of the standard deviation of the risk 
attitude parameter.  This parameter represents between-individual heterogeneity.  The slight de-
parture of its estimate from its true value is a consequence of the fact that there are only two 
rounds in this game; at most two observations are available for each contestant.  The inconsis-
tency in the estimation of this parameter can of course be avoided by increasing the sample size 
and/or the number of rounds in the game.  Table A1.3 shows results of the same simulation of 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 104 21
the “selection” model, but with a larger sample size of 2000.  Here, we see, as expected, that all 
four of the parameters are estimated without bias. 
 
Model with selection; sample size = 2000 
  True value  Mean  Std. Err.  p-value of 
t-test 
Mean risk attitude  0.02000 0.02001 0.00002 0.7967 
Log std. dev. risk attitude  -4.42285 -4.42612 0.00204  0.1091 
5 β   0.55000 0.54866 0.00127  0.2909 
Log. Std. Dev. Fechner-error  -2.99573 -2.99734 0.00228  0.4805 
Table A1.3: The table reports summary statistics of the Monte Carlo study.  The assumed utility func-
tional is CARA.  The beliefs equation assumed is  ( ) ( ) 55 .. off EV β = % .  Number of replications: 1000 
 
Appendix 2: Modelling the Banker’s Offer function 
The hypothesis of rational expectations implies that contestants are capable of forecasting the 
Banker’s offer in future rounds in the same way as an econometrician with access to estimation 
algorithms.  We therefore use data on Banker’s offers from all showings, to estimate the true of-
fer function in each round.  The rational expectations hypothesis can then be taken to imply that 
contestants form beliefs according to the estimated true offer functions. 
The key explanatory variable in the determination of the offer is the expected value 
(EV) of the remaining prizes.   
 
Banker’s offer in Round 4 
Figure A2.1 shows a scatter of the round 4 offers against EV.  A 45
0-line is super-imposed.  The 
most obvious feature of the scatter is that the offer rises with EV.  It is also noticed that the offer 
is nearly always far below EV.  A fanning out effect is also evident, with the variance of offers 
rising as EV rises.  In view of the strong positive skew seen in both variables, it is appropriate to 
take logarithms before analysing the relationship.  Figure A2.2 shows a scatter of the logged 
variables.  Here we see that the relationship is clearly log-linear.  The plot also appears homo-
scedastic.  We therefore estimate the straightforward log-linear regression: 
 
() ( ) 44 log log offer EV u γβ = ++ ,  (A2.1) 
 
where the 4 subscripts are present since we are restricting attention to round 4.  The results from 











.  (A2.2) 
 
We may deduce from this estimated regression equation that contestants who form ra-
tional expectations use the following formula for the expected offer in round 4: 
 
( ) exp 0.460 0.857log offer EV =⎡ − + ⎤ ⎣⎦ .  (A2.3) 
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Figure A2.2: Logarithm of offer against logarithm of expected value in round 4.  45°-line superimposed. 
 
Banker’s Offer in Round 5 
Figure A2.3 shows offer against expected value for all offers made in round 5.  A 45
0-line is 
again super-imposed.  Again it is also clear that the offer rarely exceeds the expected value.  
However, a difference from round 4 is that some points appear to be on (or very close to) the 
45
0-line, implying that the offer exactly equals the expected value.  We shall treat these observa-
tions as upper-censored observations.  Note that this censoring tends to arise when the expected 
value is comparatively low.  When the expected value is high, the offer is usually below the ex-
pected value.  Note also that there is one observation above the 45
0-line.  This observation is in-
terpreted as errant behaviour on the part of the Banker, and is omitted from the censored regres-
sion reported below. 
Figure A2.4 shows the scatter of the logged variables.  The censoring that was apparent 
in figure A2.3 is even more clearly apparent in figure A2.4, with a sizable portion of the sample 
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Figure A2.4: Logarithm of offer against logarithm of expected value in round 5.  45°-line superimposed. 
 
We estimate the following censored regression model (omitting the one observation that 
is above the 45
0 line): 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )





log log log log
log log log log
~0 , u
offer EV u if EV u EV





=+ + + + <
=+ + ≥   (A2.4) 
 
where the 5 subscripts are present since we are restricting attention to round 5.  The results from 









n = 106 
34 uncensored observations 
72 right-censored observations 
(A2.5) 
 
We deduce the following formula for predicted offer in round 5: 
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( ) ( ) min ,exp 0.665 1.305log offer EV EV ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ .  (A2.6) 
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